Abstract Data envelopment analysis (DEA), a useful assessment tool, has been used to solve the problem of preference voting and aggregation which require the determination of the weights associated with different ranking places. Instead of applying the same externally imposed weighting scheme to all candidates, DEA models allow each candidate to choose his/her own weights in order to maximize his/her own overall ratings subject to certain conditions. It is evident that competition exists among the candidates in a preferential election, while there is no literature considering the factor of competition. This paper proposes an approach to rank candidates based on DEA game cross efficiency model, in which each candidate is viewed as a player who seeks to maximize its own efficiency, under the condition that the cross efficiencies of each of other DMU's does not deteriorate. The game cross efficiency score is obtained when the DMU's own maximized efficiencies are averaged. The obtained game cross efficiency scores constitute a Nash Equilibrium point. Therefore, the results and orders based upon game cross efficiency analysis are more reliable and will benefit the decision-maker.
Introduction
In a preferential voting system, each voter selects a subset of the candidates and places them in a ranked order. The key issue of the preference aggregation in a preferential voting system is how to determine the weights associated with different ranking places. To avoid the subjectivity in determining the weights, data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used in Cook and Kress [1] to determine the most favorable weights for each candidate. Different candidates utilize different sets of weights to calculate their total scores, which are referred to as the best relative total scores and are all restricted to be less than or equal to one. The candidate with the biggest relative total score of one is said to be DEA efficient and may be considered as a winner. This approach proves to be effective, but very often leads to more than one candidate to be DEA efficient. To choose a winner from among the DEA-efficient candidates, Cook and Kress [1] suggest maximizing the gap between the weights so that only one candidate is left as DEA efficient. Green, Doyle and Cook [2] suggest using the cross-efficiency evaluation method in DEA to choose the winner. Noguchi, Ogawa and Ishii [3] also utilize cross-efficiency evaluation technique to select the winner, but present a strong ordering constraint on the weights. Hashimoto [4] proposes the use of the DEA exclusion model (i.e. super-efficiency model) to identify the winner. Obata and Ishii [5] suggest excluding non-DEA-efficient candidates and using normalized weights to discriminate the DEA-efficient candidates. Their method is subsequently extended to rank non-DEA-efficient candidates by Foroughi and Tamiz [6] and Foroughi, Jones and Tamiz [7] . Recently, Wang, Chin and Yang [8] also propose three new models to assess the weights and rank the candidates. In fact, candidates in a preferential election setting can be viewed as DMUs, and competition is obviously present among the candidates. Unfortunately, there is no literature discussed above considering this topic. In this paper, DEA game cross efficiency model, a useful assessment tool for considering the factor of competition, will be used to rank the candidates in a preferential election setting. The rest of the paper unfolds as follows: in section 2, the original models for preferential voting and aggregation are presented, and the approach based on DEA game cross efficiency model is proposed. A numerical example is illustrated in Section 3 and concluding remarks are given in Section 4.
Model
In the preferential voting framework each candidates i=1,...,n receives some number v i1 of first place votes, v i2 of second place votes..., v im of mth place votes. The problem is to use these votes in a reasonable manner to obtain an overall desirability index Z i for each candidate. In fact, for any predetermined set of weights w 1 ,...,w m on each candidate's standing, the composite score, Z i , of candidate i would be defined by:
Cook and Kress [1] propose a DEA model that allowed all candidates to choose his/her own weights in order to maximize his/her own desirability index subject to certain reasonable constraints on the desirabilities of all candidates. For candidate i of n candidates, the model of Cook and Kress [1] can be written as: 
Each of them leads to a different winner. Noguchi et al. [3] examine the six special cases of the discriminating factor ε : ε = 0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.055, 0.06, 0.07. These cases also resulted in different winners. To avoid the difficulties in determining the discrimination intensity function d(·, ε) and the discrimination intensity factor ε, Noguchi et al. [3] suggest a strong ordering DEA model as follows:
where N is the number of voters. In our view, the strong ordering constraint
It also makes the choice of the discrimination intensity function d(·, ε) unnecessary. Especially, as indicated in Noguchi et al. [3] , the weights of each rank are determined in allowable region, and from the result of votes, the above strong ordering in Noguchi et al. [3] is superior to the method by Green et al. [2] . So, this strong ordering constraint will be adopted in the new models to be developed.
For each DM U i (i = 1, . . . , n) under evaluation of model (2.3), we obtain a set of optimal weights (ω * i1 , ω * i2 , . . . , ω * im ). Using this set, the i-cross efficiency for any DM U p (p = 1, . . . , n), is then calculated as:
can be used to determine the cross efficiency score for DM U p .
In what follows, we will present our new model, which is based on the DEA game cross efficiency model presented in Liang, Wu, Cook and Zhu [9] . The new model is given as follows:
where α d ≤ 1 is a parameter. In the algorithm to be developed, this α d initially takes the value given by the average original cross efficiency of DM U d . We refer to model (2.6) 
is called the average game cross efficiency for that DMU. Note that the average game cross efficiency no longer represents a regular DEA crossefficiency value. Liang, Wu, Cook and Zhu [9] presented a procedure for determining the final game cross efficiency for DM U i .
Step 1: Solve model (2.3) and obtain a set of original average DEA cross efficiency scores defined in (2.5). Let t = 1 and
Step 2: Solve model (2.6). Let α
where ω Step 3 is used to indicate when to terminate the process of executing model (2.6).
In Liang, Wu, Cook and Zhu [9] , this algorithm has been proven to be convergent and the game cross efficiency determined by the solution from the proposed algorithm above is a Nash Equilibrium point to the DEA game in which DMU is viewed as player and the game cross efficiencies are considered as the payoffs. The game cross efficiency score is a Nash equilibrium solution and therefore is a stable solution. Thus, the results and decisions based upon game cross efficiency analysis are reliable.
Numerical Example
In this section, we examine a numerical example using the proposed models to illustrate their use and show their capabilities of choosing the winner and ranking candidates.
We consider the example discussed in Cook and Kress [1] , in which 20 voters are asked to rank four out of six candidates A-F on a ballot. For example, candidate "a" receives 3 first, 3 second, 4 third and 3 fourth-placed votes. The votes each candidate receives are shown in Table 1 .
For this example, n = 6, m = 4 and N = 20, so the parameter of ε in model (2.6) is equal to 0.005. For the value of δ in the algorithm, we set δ = 0.0001 and we use the regular cross efficiency defined in (2.4) as the starting point for our game cross efficiency scores. Cross efficiency is not unique and can be calculated by imposing a secondary goal. For example, we can use an aggressive strategy which not only obtains the maximum DEA efficiency for a DMU as the primary goal, but also as a secondary goal, minimizes the other DMUs' cross efficiencies (Sexton, Silkman and Hogan [10] ). We can also use a benevolent strategy which not only obtains the maximum DEA efficiency but also maximizes the other DMUs' cross efficiencies (Doyle and Green [11] ). The cross-efficiency calculated without imposing the secondary goal is referred to as an arbitrary strategy, as defined in (2.4). The [3] are reported in the second column of Table 2 .
The results of the cross-efficiency under three strategies are listed in the third column of Table 2 . The game cross efficiency is shown in the last column. All these cross-efficiency scores lead to the same game cross efficiency scores. Figure 1 shows the solution process for candidate B. If one views the candidates as competitive, it is noted that in a cooperative sense each "player" has an improved score over that which it received under the usual cross efficiency models (except in the case of the 100% efficient candidate D). Figure 2 shows after 17 iterations, the proposed algorithm finds the game cross efficiency scores for the six candidates and it can be seen that the game cross efficiency score increases when t becomes an even number and decreases when t becomes an odd number. We should point out that this example is chosen only for illustrative purposes and for better understanding of the principles of the proposed approach. The contribution of our approach lies in the fact that we find a solution that is a Nash Equilibrium and the solution is not affected by the multiple optimal solutions in the DEA models.
Conclusions
This paper has considered a preferential voting system using DEA game cross efficiency model, in which each candidate is viewed as a player that seeks to maximize its own efficiency, under the condition that the cross efficiencies of each of other DMU's does not deteriorate. In DEA game cross efficiency model, the game cross efficiency scores obtained are fixed and constitute a Nash Equilibrium point. Therefore, it is considered that the approach proposed provides an alternative method for determining an ordering of candidates in the preferential voting system.
